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Abstract 
A clause in a patent license agreement which requires the 
licensee to continuously render royalty payments even 
after the intellectual property rights have expired has 
been a very controversial issue in practice. With the 
infamous United States Supreme Court Ruling of Brulotte 
v. Thys, and its subsequent affirmation in the case of 
Kimble v. Marvel, the legality of continued royalties seems 
to be a settled provision of law in the American 
Jurisprudence. However, the judgement rendered in the 
case of Kimble v. Marvel begs the question as to whether 
the affirmation was by reason of sound judicial 
interpretation or the coercion of stare decisis. The interplay 
between the rule of reason and the per se rule on one 
hand, with that of the patent misuse theory on the other, 
was alarmingly unclear. The three were presented as 
being so closely related that the two distinct dynamics of 
law could very well be addressed as excessive legislation 
on the same subject-matter. The present research seeks to 
analyze the 2015 ruling of Kimble v. Marvel, without the 
interference of stare decisis and defines the contours under 
which the judgement was rendered (patent law or anti-
trust). Most importantly, the paper will assess the Indian 
jurisprudential stand with reference to continued 
royalties, both within patent law and the competition law. 
Keywords: Competition Act, 2002, Doctrine of Stare Decisis, Patent 
Misuse Theory, Per se Rule, Rule of Reason. 
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1. Introduction 
A clause in a patent licensing agreement which requires the 
licensee to continuously render royalties has undeniably been a 
very controversial issue. Innumerable litigations concerning such 
payments have been brought forth for the scrutiny of the courts. 
Contentions ranging from deferring of risks to stifling innovation 
have time and again been cited in favor of continued royalties.1 
Although, all such contentions and arguments have been in vain 
because of a  per se prohibition on payment of royalties after 
expiration of the patent protection granted over the patent 
introduced in 1964 and affirmed in 2015. 
The United States Supreme Court has always broadened the 
horizons of the Patent Misuse Doctrine ever since its inception in 
the case of Motion Pictures Patents.2 The doctrinal counter 
movement which was indulged into observed by the Circuit Courts 
and the District Courts after the Brulotte3 judgment was finally put 
to rest, half a decade later in Kimble v. Marvel.4 The Supreme Court 
has reaffirmed the Brulotte ruling despite the opprobrium it had 
witnessed across the judicial and the academic spectrum.5The 
affirmation was again marred by academic criticism and was 
deemed to overlook the jurisprudential developments of the late 
20th Century and the early 21st Century. The argued shift from the 
Patent misuse to Rule of Reason was sought to limit the scope of 
applicability of the former, to ensure better distribution of risk and 
a better economic environment.  
The Ninth Circuit Court which dealt with the issue prior to the writ 
being filed before the Supreme Court, was also as reluctant to 
adhere to the Brulotte Rule.6The dissenting opinion of the Kimble 
                                                          
1 Barak Orbach, Antitrust  stare decisis  stare decisis stare decisis, 15 ARIZ. LEGAL  
STUDIES PUBLICATION, 1 (2015). 
2 Motion Picture Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing 
Company et al., 243 U.S. 502, 515 (1917). 
3 Brulotte V. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). 
4 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
5 Molly Mccartney, Caught In The Web Of  stare decisis  stare decisis   stare decisis: 
Why The Supreme Court's Holding In Kimble V. Marvel Was Wrongly Decided, 
16 WAKE FOREST J. OF BUS. & INTELL. PROP..L., 492 (2016). 
6Marvel Entertainment LLC  v. Kimble, 727 F.  856 (2013). 
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ruling and the critique of the majority ruling begs the question as to 
whether the affirmation was an effect of sound statutory 
interpretation or a judgment rendered under the coercion of    stare 
decisis. The affirmation was also critiqued as being a transparent 
garb for clothing a decision rendered under the Anti-Trust laws as 
one rendered within the contours of the Patent Law.7 The reason 
for strict adherence to the Patent Misuse and the blatant disregard 
of the Rule of Reason has been the cornerstone of the critique 
witnessed by Kimble.  
The present research directly elaborates the Brulotte rule and 
analyses the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kimble v. 
Marvel.8The advantage that academic research enjoys is that unlike 
judicial interpretations it is not marred by policy concerns. Thus, 
the judgment of Kimble shall be analyzed without the interference 
of the doctrine of  stare decisis. The historical underpinnings and the 
evolution of Patent Misuse along with its current understanding in 
the light of its relevance with the Rule of Reason, shall also form a 
segment of the present research. Most importantly, there is a dearth 
of literature explaining the legality of continued royalties within 
the Indian Jurisdiction. A section of the paper has been dedicated to 
address the Indian stance on post-expiration royalties.  
2. The Brulotte Rule 
The present research hinges on the reasoning employed by the 
majority while affirming the Brulotte rule. The Kimble Court in 2015 
abjured an opportunity to bid adieu to the per se prohibition on 
post expiration royalties of patents-a move which was highly 
sought after by the American legal diaspora. The same can be 
evidenced by the nine amici curie filed in support of Kimble, as 
opposed to only five filed in support of Marvel.9 The Kimble case 
                                                          
7Maxwell C. Mcgraw, Kimble V. Marvel Entertainment, Llc: Economic Efficiency 
Caught In The Web Of Improper Judicial Restraint, 65 U. OF KAN.  L. REV. 177 
(2016). 
8Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
9See also: Kelly Casey Mullally, Your Friendly Neighborhood Patent License: 
Should Royalty Payments Based on Postexpiration Use Be  per se Unenforceable: 
Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. (13-720), 42  Preview 
 U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 238 (23). 
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was being viewed as an opportunity to frustrate the Brulotte ruling, 
or at least revise it to meet the requirements of the 21st Century. 
However, the decision upheld an arguably archaic and 
misconceived rule of law.10 
In the present case, the Thys Company sold hop-picking machines. 
Each machine included several parts, which had individual 
protection under intellectual property law. The company extracted 
a licensing fee in lieu of the machines. The licensing agreements did 
not discuss the last date for payment of royalties and thus the 
royalty payments continued after the patent expiration. The 
purchasers subsequently discontinued the payment and a case of 
infringement was registered against them. With an 8:1 division of 
the Bench, Justice Harlan delivered the minority opinion while 
Justice Douglas delivered the majority opinion. The licensing 
agreement was commented as being a ‘bald act of policymaking11’. 
The majority judgment is responsible for a per se ban on post-
expiration royalties on patent licensing agreements. 
Although, the dictum rendered in the case of Brulotte was not a 
novel line of judicial reasoning, it was arguably brewed in the same 
barrel as some of its predecessors. Precedents supported the 
conclusion drawn by the Brulotte Majority. The first issue of post 
expiration royalties was adjudicated by the US Supreme Court in 
the case of Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co.12, wherein 
it was held that “any attempted reservation or continuation in the 
patentee or those claiming under him of the patent monopoly, after the 
patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the 
policy and purpose of the patent laws.” Subsequently, the Third Circuit 
Court followed a similar line of reasoning, where it was held that 
the patent monopoly was spent on the expiration of a patent and 
any attempt to exact royalties after the expiration of patent term 
was unenforceable.13 Thus, it can very well be submitted that 
                                                          
10 Jim Day & Erik Olson, Three Significant Upcoming Patent Law Decisions 
Expected From The Supreme Court And Federal Circuit, Fabella Braun And 
Martel Llp., (Sep. 20, 2018) Https:// www.Bakerdonelson.Com/ Files/ 
March%20ip%20roundtable%20outline.Pdf. 
11 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
12 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). 
13 Ar-Tik Systems Inc. v. Dairy Queen Inc., 302 F. 496, 510 (1962). 
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Brulotte furthered the jurisprudence of the time and should not be 
arraigned as the harbinger of the per se prohibition of Post 
Expiration Royalties. 
3. Kimble v. Marvel 
In the interval of 40 years between the Brulotte rule being 
promulgated and the Kimble dispute being considered for 
adjudication by the Supreme Court, the per se prohibition had 
witnessed abundant criticism. With Justice Posner providing a very 
blunt and uninhibited criticism in Schieber v. Dolby Laboratories, 
Inc.,14along with Justice Berzon further strengthening the anti-
Brulotte reasoning in the 2007 case of Zila Inc v. Tinnell15 and the 
academic diaspora publishing various articles explaining the 
impracticality of the Brulotte rule16, the stage was set for an 
amendment to the prohibition with the Kimble dispute. 
The Kimble litigation was concerned with the licensing agreement 
of a toy, over which a patent was obtained in 1991. Kimble had 
previously sued Marvel for patent infringement, with the litigation 
finally being concluded with a settlement agreement between the 
parties. Kimble `royalty on net product sales’ was obtained. Neither 
did the agreement stipulate any period for which the royalties were 
to be paid, nor did the agreement stipulate any reduction in the 
royalty rate after the expiration of the payment. Later Marvel 
‘stumbled across’ the Brulotte rule and declared that they had no 
obligation to continue to render royalty payment, thus leading to 
the Court’s getting involved. 
The plaintiff argued for a departure from the per se prohibition, in 
favor of a case-to-case Rule of Reason approach. The court would 
have to take into account the anti or pro-competitive features of a 
licensing agreement and the economic effects which are most likely 
to register from the enforcement of the agreement. While 
substantiating the argument, Kimble argued that the Patent and 
Economic Policies favor a departure from the per se prohibition.  
                                                          
14 Schieber v. Dolby Laboratories Inc., 293 F. 1014 (2002). 
15 Zila Inc v. Tinnell, 502 F. 1014 (2007). 
16 Michael Koenig, Patent Royalties Extending Beyond Expiration: An Illogical Ban 
From Brulotte To Scheiber, 2 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 1 (2003). 
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With a divided Bench (6:3), Justice Kagan delivered the judgment 
which affirmed the per se prohibition on post-expiration royalty 
arrangements, crippling the concerns which were time and again 
cited against the Brulotte rule. The majority opined that a licensing 
agreement which provides for payment of royalties after the 
expiration of the patent, incorrectly extends the rights accrued from 
the patent. The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Alito 
who leaned on the majority’s interpretation of    stare decisis to 
question and negate the conclusions of the majority. The dissent 
was prominently based on the majority’s interpretation of the 
Doctrine of Stare Decisis and statements like “State decisis does not 
require us to retain baseless and damaging precedent.”17 The Brulotte 
rule was criticized as the result of a singular antitrust concern, that 
post expiration royalties were an effort to enlarge the statutorily 
awarded monopoly. The relevance of the promulgation within the 
contours of the Patent Law was not examined and it was pointed 
out that nothing in the text of the Patent Act, 197018 “even arguably 
forbids licensing agreements that provide for post-expiration 
royalties.” 
The most controversial dictum of the judgment which also forms 
the basis of the present research, was that the dispute has been 
adjudicated entirely within the contours of the patent law and not 
the anti-trust law. While the latter provides for a wider scope of 
judicial interpretation and construction, the applicability of the 
former is statutorily dictated and there is minimal scope of judicial 
interpretation. Thus, any economic consideration cannot be 
submitted for adjudication because of the limited interpretative 
scope of the Patent Act, 1970.19 
4. Kimble without stare decisis 
Various authors have time and again remarked that the affirmation 
by the Kimble court was not a result of sound judicial interpretation, 
                                                          
17 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
18 The Patents Act, Act No. 39 of 1970, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India). 
19 The Patents Act, Act No. 39 of 1970, Acts of Parliament, 1994 (India). 
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but a judgment rendered to respect stare decisis.20 The Court 
explicitly remarked “an argument that we got something wrong- 
even a good argument- cannot by itself justify scrapping a settled 
precedent.21 ”The Court quoted Justice Brandi,“ that it is more 
important the principle of law be settled than it be settled right.” 
The fact that Brulotte was a case of statutory construction 
overlapping with the tenets of contract law, the force of stare decisis 
is at its acme.22 
Despite an unequivocal confession that the principles underlying 
the Brulotte rule might be incorrect, the court declined to frustrate 
the settled principle of law. Academics have bluntly stated that, 
“Posner J.'s blunt criticism of the rule and the blatant reliance on    
stare decisis by the Kimble court shows that even the judiciary is 
covertly ashamed but too proud to concede.”23 The conclusion of 
the judgment also relied on the fact that Congress had held that the 
per se rule should not be relied on by the judiciary. The majority 
cited the case of Watson v. United States24 where the Court 
considered that no congressional interference for fourteen years 
accorded extra precedential importance to the judgement.  The 
force of stare decisis and Congressional conduct made a very strong 
case against the overruling of the precedent. 
The dissenting opinion in the case of Kimble v. Marvel25 also raises 
some genuine concerns about the application of stare decisis. The 
dissenting opinion delivered by Justice Alito, expressly states that    
stare decisis should not be perused to uphold a groundless and 
harmful precedent. Also, the fact that Congress has not indulged 
                                                          
20 A. Balto & A.M. Wolman, Intellectual Property And Antitrust: General 
Principles.43 IDEA: J. OF L. & TECH. 395 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Rule Of Reason, 70, FLORIDA L. REV., 96 (2018). 
21 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
22 S.J. Waxman. May You Live In Interesting Times: Patent Law In The 
Supreme Court, 17 Chi. Kent J. Of Intell. Prop. 214 (2017). 
23 Esther Valerie Mongare. Patent Term Under Review, Kimble V Marvel 
Entertainment Llc: Patent Term And Innovation, SSRN Electronic J., (2018). 
24 552 U.S. 74, 82-83, 128 S.Ct. 579, 169 L.Ed.2d472 (2007). 
25 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
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into the analysis of the viability of a precedent should not be 
considered as a source of authority to a bad law.26 
5. Patent Misuse and Economic Concerns 
The Patent Misuse Doctrine is essentially a legal fiction i.e. a 
theoretical construction which does not find authority within a 
legislative framework.27 The doctrine is an equitable remedy which 
is analogous to the ‘unclean hands’ doctrine of Tort Law, which 
purports that any willful conduct that is iniquitous, unfair, 
dishonest, fraudulent, unconscionable, or performed in bad faith, 
can be a ground for the Court to deny any equitable relief claimed 
in the factual matrix.28 It denies the enforcement of a patent if the 
patentee abuses the privileges granted by the patent law.29 
The 1917 case of Motion Picture Patents Co.30, has often been credited 
to have developed the affirmative defence of patent misuse.31 The 
patentee did not allow the purchasers to show moving pictures 
printed on competitors’ film. The Court reiterated the principles 
underlying the registration of patents and laid down that the patent 
grant must be limited to the invention described in the claims of the 
patent. Subsequently, the doctrine was further substantiated in the 
case of Morton Salt v. Suppiger.32  Suppiger required that licensees 
of its patented salt depositing machines use its unpatented salt 
tablets. The Brulotte case drew its importance from the fact that the 
Patent Misuse doctrine was freed from the shackles of tie-in 
arrangements and was implemented in the purview of Post 
expiration royalties. The Federal Courts of the late 20th Century 
                                                          
26 B. Orbach, Antitrust  stare decisis  stare decisis   stare decisis 15 Arizona L. 
Discussion Paper 1 (2015). 
27 Feldman, R.C., (2003). The Insufficiency of antitrust analysis for patent 
misuse. Hastings Law Journal, 55, p.399. 
28 Ori J. Herstein, A Normative Theory Of The Clean Hands Defence, CORNELL L. 
FAC. PUBL’N. PAPER 210 (2011). 
29 Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse And Antitrust: Rebirth Or False Dawn, 20 Mich. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV., 299 (2013). 
30 Motion Picture Patents Co. V. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 
502 (1917). 
31 Cassandra Havens, Saving Patent Law From Competition Policy And Economic 
Theories: Kimble V. Marvel Entertainment, 31, Berkley TECH. L. J., 371 (2015). 
32 Morton Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
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attempted to limit the scope of the patent misuse doctrine.33 The 
case of Princov. ITC34 i has been given special emphasis in this 
respect. 
5.1 Patent Misuse and Anti-Trust Analysis 
Patent Misuse as has been declared in the Kimble case, does not 
consider any economic or competitive repercussions of the alleged 
misuse. An anti-trust analysis, particularly the Rule of Reason, 
which was sought as a replacement to the per se prohibition by 
Kimble, rigorously examines whether an agreement unreasonably 
restricts competition.35It means performing and analyzing any 
potential anti-competitive effects of a patent license and whether 
there are pro-competitive effects that outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects.36 
The doctrine of Patent Misuse before the promulgation of Kimble v. 
Marvel was remarked as a ‘Patent Anti-Trust Double Helix,’37, 
wherein an anti-trust analysis could have been indulged in to 
specify whether or not the concerned agreement is covered under 
the Patent Misuse Doctrine. In the year 2014, Prof. Daryl Lim 
published an article immediately before the Kimble case was up for 
adjudication before the United States Supreme Court and feared 
that the Supreme Court might disrupt the understanding of the 
Patent Misuse, which was developed by the Federal Circuit 
Courts.38 The Supreme Court in the Kimble ruling explicitly 
declared that a Patent Misuse case could not indulge in an anti-
trust analysis.  
                                                          
33 Virginia Panel Corporation v. Mac Panel Corporation., 887 F. 880 (1995); B. 
Braun Medical Incorporated v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F. (1997); 
Mallinckrodt Incorporated v. Medipart, 976 F. 700 (1992). 
34 Princo Coporation v. International Trade Commission, 616 F.1318 (2010). 
35 Daniel Fundakowski, The Rule Of Reason: From Balancing To Burden Shifting, 
1 PERSPECTIVES IN ANTITRUST, 2 (2013). 
36 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
COMPETITION (2007). 
37 Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse And Antitrust: Rebirth Or False Dawn, 20 Mich. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV., 299 (2013). 
38 Id. 
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Other authors have also opined that a rule of reason approach is far 
superior than a per se prohibition on the provision of Post-
Expiration Royalties. The Kimble court has failed to appreciate that 
the issue in substance is patent leveraging and coercion, which is 
not necessarily a factor of extended royalty agreements. Wade and 
Warren argue that the modern anti-trust principles coupled with 
traditional judicial tools to confront fraud and coercion, are much 
better suited than  per se or artificial rules that presume a harm or 
use of leverage that may not in fact be present.39 The argument 
fostered is one of merit, as not all patents ensure a leverage over an 
extremely competitive market, and what they accord is a possible 
market power.  
Instead of providing a blanket prohibition, which stems from the 
reasoning that all patents entitle the patent holder to coerce the 
market into self-harming contractual relationships, the Courts 
should actually inquire into whether or not the questioned practice 
imposes an unreasonable restrain on competition. If the answer is 
in the affirmative, the Courts can very well declare the agreement 
void and restore what is espoused in Kimble, because following this 
approach won’t allow several patents to realize their investments 
due to paucity of time. 
6. Analysis of Kimble v. Marvel 
Innumerable academic papers since the promulgation of the Kimble 
v. Marvel ruling in 2015 have strongly criticised the affirmation of 
the Brulotte rule. These criticisms can be broadly categorized into 
two--those which stem from the legal principles involved in the 
promulgation of the rule; and those which stem from equity and 
are not necessarily dependent on legal principles. For the sake of 
brevity, the former is labelled legal concerns and the latter is policy 
concerns.  
a. Legal Concerns 
The Kimble Court repeatedly argued that the Brulotter rule was 
based on statutory consideration of Patent Law and Contractual 
                                                          
39 Leslie Ware & Jaden Warren, Rule Of Reason For Post-Expiration Patent 
Royalties, 11, J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC.,37 (2016). 
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Law. Thus, emphasizing the effect of    stare decisis on the judgment. 
Whereas, the fact of the matter is that apart from a passing 
reference made to the Article 8 of the American Constitution, no 
specific interpretation of singular provisions of the patent law was 
applied by the Brulotte Court.  
The Brulotte court had opined that post expiration royalties increase 
the duration of the patent monopoly accorded to a patent by the 
sovereign authority. Such interpretation is erroneous subject to the 
fact that registration of a patent essentially embodies a right to 
exclude, which entitles the patent holder to exclude any person 
from infringing his patent.40 With the expiration of the patent, the 
right to exclude also expires41 and the technical know-how 
encapsulated by the registration is open to exploitation by the 
general public. The relationship between the licensor and licensee 
does not stem from patent laws, but from the contractual 
relationship they have previously established. The only case where 
the post-expiration royalties can extend the scope of a patent is 
when the patent enjoys tremendous market power and the licensor 
is able to coerce the licensee into an extended payment period for 
the patent. As has been previously elaborated, not all patents enjoy 
such market power and the Supreme Court’s assumption is 
completely misplaced.  
The  per se ban on Post Expiration Royalties stifles competition, 
because it disincentivizes the registration of a patent, which is 
necessary to ensure that the patent comes into the public domain. 
The inventor, instead of registering his invention as a patent, can 
protect his invention as a Trade Secret. Such a move would result 
in the frustration of the quid pro quo principle of Patent Law. 
The following two cases can further elaborate the scope of this 
hypothesis: 
Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds42, popularly 
known as the Listerine Case. The case involved the licensing of the 
formula which was required for the production of Listerine. A 
                                                          
40 Hovenkamp, Supranote 14.  
41 Wolman, Supranote 22. 
42 Warner Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, 911 F. 970, 975 
(1990). 
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licensing agreement was entered into with Dr. Lawrence for the 
formula. By the time the case was instituted, a royalty amount of 
almost $2.2 billion had already been paid with an accrued income 
of over $1.5 billion due to be paid every year. The Listerine 
Formula had been completely in the public domain and had once 
even been published in the National Formulary and Journal of 
American Medical Association. Despite the formula being in the 
public domain, it was not attributable to negligence by the plaintiff 
or any of his predecessors in title. The question was whether after 
75 years of paying royalty, the plaintiff was supposed to continue 
the rendering of royalties? The Court answered in the affirmative 
and declared that there is no bar on the payment of indefinite 
royalties and that the term of royalty payments shall be determined 
according to the terms of the licensing agreement.43 
Another such instance where post-expiration royalties in case of 
trade secrets was allowed is Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.44The 
case involved a pending patent application submitted on October 
25, 1956. The underlying invention was licensed on the condition 
that if the patent application is successful and the patent is 
registered, the licensee would be subjected to a 5% royalty on the 
overall sales. However, in the event that the pending application is 
eventually unsuccessful and the patent is not registered, the royalty 
rate would be limited to 2.5%. The application eventually failed 
and the subject ‘invention’ was not accorded patent protection. The 
license agreement was entered in June-July 1956 and the licensee 
sought a declaratory judgment to frustrate the agreement in 
October 1975. The Supreme Court considered the import of the 
Brulotte rule in the present case and opined that since during the 
negotiation of the licensing agreement no patent was involved, 
there was no threat of leveraging and coercion and the contract 
entered into between the parties was valid.45What is interesting is 
that the Aronson decision has been considered by the Ninth Circuit 
                                                          
43 Wie Lin Wang, A Study On The Legality Of Royalty Collection Clauses After 
Expiration Of Patent Rights, 15 THE JOHN MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 
214 (2016). 
44 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Company, 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
45 Frank Caprio, The Trouble With Brulotte: The Patent Royalty Term And Patent 
Monopoly Extension, 4 UTAH L. REV. 830-832 (1990).  
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Court in the case of Kimble, wherein the lack of judicial coherence in 
the subject has been highlighted.  
The above two decisions posit a very unique conclusion. Any 
invention which has been granted statutory patent protection 
cannot be the subject of an extended royalty agreement. Whereas, 
an ‘invention’ which is ineligible of patent protection or one in 
respect of which a patent application has not even been submitted, 
can very well be the subject of an extended royalty arrangement. 
These points towards an apprehension of the US Supreme Court, 
that whenever patent protection is involved, it is possible that the 
patent holder has coerced the licensee into an unfavorable licensing 
agreement. This apprehension has been so blinding that the court 
simply refuses to indulge in any analysis of whether or not such 
licensing agreements are actually coercive.  
The jurisprudence behind the application of the Doctrine of Patent 
Misuse witnessed significant development ever since the Brulotte 
judgment. Although, thoroughly critiqued46, the Princo case has 
had a very important impact on the understanding of the Patent 
Misuse Doctrine. With the Princo ruling, patent misuse 
jurisprudence was substantially entangled with Anti-Trust 
concepts. The judgment unequivocally provided that misuse occurs 
when and only when the patentee abuses the protection granted 
with anti-competitive actions. 
Kimble reaffirms the doctrine of cases holding that misuse is not 
anti-trust and does not need to be validated with actual anti-
competitive effects. Without any deliberation over the Federal 
Circuit Courts’ stride in the understanding of patent misuse, the 
Supreme Court overruled the Circuit Courts’ 40 years’ worth of 
efforts.   
b. Policy Concerns 
The Brulotte judgment itself provided for contracting clauses which 
could be incorporated to negotiate around the Brulotte prohibition. 
Kimble followed the same trend and enumerated the contracts 
                                                          
46 Saami Zain, Misuse Of Misuse: Princo Corp. V. International Trade Commission 
and The Federal Circuit's Misguided Patent Misuse Jurisprudence, 13 N. C. J. OF 
L. & TECH. 95 (2011). 
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which are not prohibited by the ruling. It has often been suggested 
that these measures clearly indicate the court’s acquiescence of the 
fact that the rule being promulgated by them comes with its fair 
share of economic headaches.47 
The dissenting judgement of the Supreme Court has explicitly 
underlined that the alternate contracting arrangements are an 
economical inefficiency in themselves. The Majority expected the 
parties to draft and word their licensing agreement specifically 
keeping in mind the drafting plot embodied in the judgments. If 
such a trend of judicial intervention is allowed, the list of 
judgments which would require compliance would become very 
complicated.48The dissent further highlighted that the alternate 
suggestions and contracting manoeuvres despite being a far more 
convoluted means to achieve the same end, fails to provide the 
same efficiency as an agreement providing for continued royalties. 
Such man oeuvres can potentially give rise to novel contracting 
terms and thus open a Pandora’s Box of interpreting very 
intricately worded contract terms. 
The most important policy concern relating to the per se 
prohibition stems from the fact that it can very well be perused as a 
tool to mislead the licensor into lower royalty rates. The factual 
scenario in Kimble v. Marvel is a classic example of this exercise. 
Marvel argued that they had ‘stumbled across’ Brulotte and subject 
to the rule enunciated therein, they were not willing to pay any 
royalties to Kimble henceforth. Parties which do not possess the 
legal acumen or the resources might be unaware of the Brulotte rule 
shall be at the losing end of the licensing agreement.49 On the other 
hand, parties which are well aware of the rule would ensure lower 
royalty payments extended over a longer period and subsequently 
                                                          
47 Mcgraw, Supra note 8. 
48 A similar view was posited in the Amicus Brief of Memorial Sloan-Kettering 
Cancer Center in conjunction with other research centres. Kimble v. 
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015) (No. 13-720), 2015 WL 673668 
49 Jason Rantanen, Exorcising The Spirit Of Justice Douglas, Patentlyo (Oct. 20, 
2018), Https://Patentlyo.Com/Patent/2015/04/Exorcising-Justice-
Douglas.Html; See also: S. Doyle, Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect 
Economic Rationale, (Oct. 20, 2018) http://www. americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/ at303000_ ebulletin_ 
20130122.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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can take refuge in the  per se ban to frustrate the agreement. Thus, 
opportunistically taking unfair advantage at the cost of the other 
parties. 
7. Indian Perspective 
The history of patent misuse can be traced back to the Tek Chand 
Committee Report.50The  interim report was submitted on 4th 
August, 1949 with recommendations for prevention of misuse or 
abuse of patent right in India, and suggested amendments to 
Sections 22, 23 & 23A of the Patents & Designs Act, 191151along the 
lines of the United Kingdom Acts 191952 and 1949.53 Based on the 
recommendations of the Committee, a Bill was introduced in the 
Parliament in 1953.54 However, the Government did not press for 
the consideration of the bill and it was allowed to lapse.  
With the advancement in the statute on the patent abuse 
hypothesis over the globe, the Indian government in the year 2008, 
presented a Department related Parliamentary Standing 
Committee Report on Patent and Trade System in India. The 
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research has pointed out 
the indispensability of a strong licensing system in the country, for 
ensuring business development.55 A resolution of the 
abovementioned legal conundrum is necessary for strengthening 
the licensing system. 
7.1. Lack of Judicial Instruction 
The Indian courts are yet to propound any judgment based on 
patent abuse precept unequivocally. Nonetheless, in the case of 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v. Competition Commission of 
                                                          
50 PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMM. ON COMMERCE, REP. ON PAT. & 
TRADEMARKS SYS. IN INDIA (2018). 
51 §22, 23 & 23A,The Patent and Designs Act, No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1911 
(India). 
52 U.K. Patents Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5. c. 80.. 
53 U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6. c. 62. 
54 BILL NO. 59, GAZETTE OF INDIA (1953),Http:// Egazette.Nic.In/ 
Writereaddata/1953/E-2254-1953-0049-104387.Pdf. 
55 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Company, 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
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India,56 the issue of abuse of patent rights resulting in anti-
competitive consequences was raised, which in a nutshell is the 
essence of patent misuse. The defendant companies, Micromax and 
Intex, had accused the plaintiff company, Ericsson, of abusing its 
position of dominance. Ericsson had entered into separate licensing 
agreements with Micromax and Intex with respect to Standard 
Essential Patents. It was alleged that Ericsson was extorting unfair 
royalty rates and limiting the development of technology in the 
relevant field, by seeking such high royalties. They were able to do 
so because the Indian manufacturers were being denied market 
access. The Competition Commission of India in its order held that 
the practices adopted by Ericsson were against the principle of 
FRAND (fairness, reasonableness and non-discrimination). The 
Court held that pressurizing the implementer to accept non-
FRAND terms amounted to abuse of a dominant position. 
The ground for allegations against Ericsson was Section 4 of the 
Competition Act, 2002,57 which prohibits abuse of dominant 
position by any enterprise. Demanding excessive royalties was read 
as denial of market access, which constituted abuse of dominant 
position. The question of whether seeking royalties beyond the 
expiration of the patent protection also constitutes abuse of 
dominant position has not yet been raised. 
As has already been observed in the present paper, there is an acute 
paucity of literature on the issue of post-patent royalties in India 
except for a 2009 Delhi High Court judgment58, which simply holds 
that patent-holder cannot demand post-patent royalties, without 
actually proffering any rationale for the same. The Court clearly 
observed that: 
Where the statute provides that the patent is allowed 
only for a limited period, the license of the patent 
cannot extend beyond that limited period. A license 
agreement for patents can be valid only during the 
                                                          
56 TelefonaktiebolagetLm Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission Of 
India, (2016) 1 DLT 232 (India). 
57 §4,The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
58 National Research Development Corporation v. Abs Plastics Ltd,(2009) 40 
PTC 613 (India). 
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currency of the patent. Where the patent itself 
expires, the license of the patent also expires. 
Dr. Vahini, an assistant professor at the National Law School of 
India University, Bangalore observed that within the Indian Legal 
Spectrum an agreement requiring royalties to be paid even after the 
patent has expired, constitutes as being a practice which hampers 
competition.59Keeping in view the above perceptions made, it can 
be seen that the Indian judicial system is a long way behind and it 
is imperative that the judiciary take into consideration the 
aforementioned misbehaviours and attempt to counter them. The 
decisions must be sound, uniform and leave minimal room for 
loopholes to be found, otherwise the plethora of judgments will 
serve no purpose whatsoever. 
In the light of the dearth of academic literature and judicial 
instruction, this part of the paper argues that Section 3 of the 
Competition Act, 200260 which specifically prohibits anti-
competitive agreements does not institute a  per se prohibition on 
agreements, which purport payment of continued royalties. 
Similarly, Section 140 and Section 141 of the Patent Act, 197061 
restrain the imposition of certain restrictive covenants in Patent 
related agreements. Neither of these sections provide for any 
exclusion of covenants related to post-expiration royalties.  
7.2. The Competition Act, 2002 
Section 3 read with Section 19, sub-section 3 of the Competition 
Act, 200262 determines the scope of covenants which have an 
Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC) within a 
market. An agreement providing for continued royalties alleged as 
being anti-competitive, would be judged on the pedestal of Section 
3.63Section 3, sub-section564 carves an exception for anti-
                                                          
59 VERSHA VAHINI, INDIAN COMPETITION LAW 137 1st Ed. (2015). 
60 §3,The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
61 §140, 141 The Patent and Designs Act, No.2, Acts of Parliament, 1911 (India). 
62 TelefonaktiebolagetLm Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission Of 
India, (2016) 1 DLT 232 (India); §19(3), No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 
(India). 
63 TelefonaktiebolagetLm Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission Of 
India, (2016) 1 DLT 232 (India). 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.1                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
 
18 
 
competitive agreements which are in reasonable juxtaposition with 
the bundle of rights granted by virtue of Patent Act, 
1970.65Therefore, it would be safe to say that there is no explicit 
prohibition against extended royalty agreements and a Rule of 
Reason approach will be employed to address any allegation 
against such covenants.66 
A detailed analysis of Section 3 is made herein under: Section 3, 
sub-section167 lays down the general prohibition against use of 
anti-competitive agreements, while Section 3, sub-section 268 
declares that any agreement to such effect shall be void. Section 3, 
sub-section 369 identifies four types of horizontal agreements and 
puts such agreements on a unique pedestal, owing to the possible 
pernicious effect that these agreements can potentially have on the 
free market. Although, the standard associated with these 
agreements is also not the same as the per se Rule.70 In fact, Section 
3, sub-section371 uses the words shall presume which institutes a 
refutable presumption in favour of AAEC. The burden of proof 
rests on the Defendant to show that the agreement does not cause 
any AAEC in accordance with Section 19, sub-section3.72 A similar 
view has been expressed in the case of FICCI Multiplex Association of 
India v. United Producers/ Distributors Forum (UPRF),73 where the 
commission held that the presumption contained in S. 3(3) is 
rebuttable and the parties may present evidence to controvert the 
                                                                                                                                    
64 §3(5),The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
65 S. Chakravarthy, Competition Act, 2002: The Approach, In, TOWARDS A 
FUNCTIONAL COMPETITION POLICY FOR INDIA. 
66 ParamjeetBerawal, Section 3(5)(I) Of The Competition Act- An Analysis, 27 
NLSIR 168 (2015). 
67 §3(1),The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
68 §3(2),The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
69 §3(3),The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
70 ARIJIT PASAYAT, SUDHANSHU KUMAR, S.M. DUGAR’S GUIDE OF COMPETITION 
LAW, 208, 209 6th Ed. (2016). 
71 Berawal, Supranote 72. 
72 Uniglobe Mod Travels Pvt. Ltd. v. Travel Agents Federation Of India, (2011) 
COMPLR 400; M/S Snatuka Associates Pvt. Ltd. v.. All India Organisation 
Of Chemists And Druggists, (2013) COMPLR 223. 
73 Federation Of Indian Chambers Of Commerce & Industry Multiplex 
Association Of India v. United Producers/ Distributors Forum, (2011) 
CompLR 79. 
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presumption contained therein.Section3, sub-section 474 identifies a 
number of vertical agreements which are subject to the ‘rule of 
reason’ test. That would determine whether or not the concerned 
agreement has an AAEC in the domestic Indian Market.75 The 
conclusion of such assessment would determine whether or not an 
agreement is anti-competitive.  
In conclusion, not only does the Competition Act, 2002 
acknowledge the unique nature of intellectual property rights, but 
also does not provide for a per se prohibition within its statutory 
scheme. Therefore, the judiciary cannot find recourse under this 
law to institute a prohibition of post-expiration royalties in India.  
Sections 140 and 141 of the Patent Act, 197076provide for certain 
conditions which aren’t enforced because of their restrictive nature, 
while covenants like Exclusive Grant Back and Coercive package 
Licensing have found relevance in the statutory scheme. Suffice it 
to say that the scheme of the legislation does not in any way 
preclude post expiration or continued royalties.  
8. Conclusion 
The majority in Kimble relied on the Doctrine of stare decisis to 
uphold the Brulotte rule.77 The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure 
stability in commercial agreements and to allow the public to enter 
into legally binding covenants, with absolute certainty. The trade-
off between stability and reasonability is one of essence here. 
Trading reasonability for stability should not be indulged into by 
the Courts. Reasonable laws are far more important than stable 
laws, as was highlighted by the minority in Kimble. While 
acknowledging that Brulotte may stifle innovations or obstruct 
competition in some circumstances, the Court doled out the 
responsibility of drafting a relevant prohibition to the Congress. 
This violates the sanctity of the three pillars understanding of a 
democratic setup and the idea of Separation of Powers. 
                                                          
74 §3(4)The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
75 Subhadip Ghosh & Thomas W. Ross, The Competition (Amendment) Bill 2007: 
A Review And Critique, ECON. & POL. WKLY., DEC. 20, 2008, At 35. 
76 §4,The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
77 Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment LLC, 135 U.S. 2401 (2015). 
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As far as the Indian jurisdiction is concerned, it is an accepted fact 
that the Intellectual Property jurisprudence of Indian Courts lags 
far behind that of its Western counterparts. The lack of any judicial 
instruction on the present subject is a prime example of this 
‘catching-up’ regime. The scarce judicial opinion which is available, 
is ill-reasoned at best. This analysis submits that the relevant 
provisions available in the Competition Act, 2002 and the Patents 
Act, 1970 do not warrant a prohibition of continued royalties 
without a case-based analysis of the subject. The lack of reasoning 
and statutory interpretation in the National Research Corp78 case 
renders the judgment Per Incuriam and therefore denudes it of all 
precedential authority. 
Robust policy guidelines would be able to act as an efficient 
solution to the problem of post patent protection expiration 
royalties. What must be remembered is that the collection of 
royalties has several advantages and disadvantages. The policy 
must attempt to strike a balance between both. Section 19 of the 
Competition Act, 200279 should further be developed by way of 
administrative rules and regulations to aid judicial conclusion. This 
would ensure that there would be a balance of interests in the 
judgments’ passed in this regard.  
                                                          
 
                                                          
78 BILL NO. 59, GAZETTE OF INDIA (1953), http:// egazette.nic.in/ 
writereaddata/1953/e-2254-1953-0049-104387.pdf. 
79 §19 The Competition Act, No.12, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India). 
